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 A great deal has been written over the years commenting on the strengths and 
weaknesses of the current system by which federal research funding has not produced the 
ideal results in terms of commercialization of inventions which are developed from such 
funding.  The Bayh-Doyle Act was enacted in an attempt to provide a single uniform 
national policy which would cut through the government bureaucracy and encourage 
collaboration between universities and private industry to ensure that federally funded, 
commercially viable inventions were brought to market in an efficient manner.  The 
question remains however, with the myriad of competing political and economic 
interests, can any legislation effectively address the myriad of conflicting interests and 
optimize such a complex system? 
 This article looks at the various interest groups that provided amicus briefs in the 
2011 Supreme Court decision in Stanford v. Roche, which highlights the diverse interests 
that attempted to weigh in on the case in an effort to ensure that their individual concerns 
were protected.  As is the case with all legislation, it is difficult if not impossible to draw 
the proper balance between such interest groups when the ultimate objective is to 
develop a policy which is intended to promote the welfare of society in general, otherwise 
such optimal results would never be achieved. 
 This article will provide a brief historical background on how our current policy 
has evolved over time, focusing on Roche to highlight the competing interests of the 
members of those organizations that are intimately involved in the research and 
commercialization process which bring discoveries that lead to inventions that benefit all 
of mankind.  The articles will conclude by arguing that policy changes can and are being 
made to improve the commercialization process without the need for major legislative 
reform. What is required however is for collaboration to take place at the university 
level, with the keen understanding of the competing interests and economic realities 
particular to the local or regional environment in order to develop well-focused 
management strategies which form commercialization ecosystems to achieve the desired 
results. This is not a one size fits all proposition, but a coordinated effort that will take on 
many different forms depending on the particular university setting. 
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¶1  Beyond an abstract theory of how the Bayh-Dole Act (“the Act”)1 should operate, 
this article focuses on the practical application and the implications of the Act in our 
current university system.  Having worked closely with university professors and students 
attempting to commercialize inventions created from research funded by the federal 
government, it became apparent that universities manage the function in a variety of ways 
and their success depends on a number of factors.  I will begin by providing a brief 
historical background on how our current technology transfer policy has evolved over 
time:  From the still-existent university framework concerning intellectual property that 
arose following World War II, to Bayh-Dole’s passage in 1980, to the continually 
evolving ways that universities manage their intellectual property and construct 
technology transfer policies. The discussion will then highlight the challenges that 
universities face in managing the process, as illustrated by the United States Supreme 
Court case Stanford v. Roche.2  
¶2  The discussion will focus on the amicus briefs submitted to the United States 
Supreme Court in Stanford v. Roche, outlining the competing interests of the members of 
those organizations that are intimately involved in the research and technology 
commercialization process which brings socially beneficial inventions to the public, 
which is the main objective of Bayh-Dole.3  This article will then conclude by arguing 
that policy changes at the university level can and are being made to improve the 
commercialization process without the need for major legislative reform.  The diversity 
of interests illustrated in Stanford creates inefficiencies at the stages where different 
interest groups become involved.  The university, vested with ultimate responsibility over 
the movement of inventions from laboratory to market,4 must enact policies that mitigate 
these inefficiencies.  Collaboration among universities, faculty-inventors, and the private 
sector must take place at the university level, with the keen understanding of the 
competing interests and economic realities particular to the local or regional environment 
in order to develop well-focused management strategies which form commercialization 
ecosystems to achieve the desired results.  This is not a one-size-fits-all approach, but a 
coordinated effort that will take on a variety of forms depending on the particular 
university setting. 
¶3  Most (if not all) universities have the potential to assist in some stage of bringing a 
university created invention to market whether as creator, scale-up manufacturer, or 
commercializer.5 Failure to commercialize an invention, it is widely believed, results 
from inefficiencies in the process, which make it economically unfeasible to continue 
development and ultimately bring the invention to the market.  These inefficiencies, as 
Stanford demonstrated, are exposed when competing interests are not properly aligned 
 
1 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212 (2000). 
2 Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., et al., 131 S.Ct. 2188 
(2011) [hereinafter Roche Molecular Sys.]. 
3 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2000). 
4 35 U.S.C. § 201 (c) (2000) (stating that “the term ‘contractor’ means any . . . nonprofit organization”). 
Universities make up the majority of nonprofit organizations. 
5 U.S. Colleges and Universities–Utility Patent Grants, Calendar Years 1969–2012, USPTO, 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/univ/total_counts/univ_ct_list_2012.htm 
[http://perma.cc/6S67-FUH9]. 
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and accounted for when creating and administering university policy.  Universities and 
their technology transfer offices (“TTOs”) must draft and adopt policies that take into 
account the diverse interests involved in the commercialization of an invention, through 
every stage of the process. 
I. BACKGROUND 
¶4  While the origin of patent law in America can be traced all the way back to the 
United States Constitution,6 the major influences that shaped patent law to this day 
generally emerged immediately following World War II.7  The focus on patent law 
during this time period was a result of the enormous (and previously unseen) amount of 
federal spending on research and development to support the war cause.8 
A. Pre-Bayh-Dole 
¶5  After World War II, the national Patent Planning Commission9 issued a report in 
1945 urging the government to retain a license to use federally funded inventions.10  A 
report by the United States Attorney General recommended that the federal government 
implement a uniform policy to retain title to all inventions developed as a result of federal 
funding.11  However, Congress failed to follow such recommendations and passed a 
multitude of statutes governing title ownership over certain programs or agencies but not 
others.12  Agencies not covered by these statutes had broad discretion to adopt an 
intellectual property policy that best suited them.  Some of the best known and most 
prominent agencies came out on opposite sides of the debate: The Department of 
Agriculture, Department of Interior, and NASA adopted the Attorney General’s “title” 
approach, while the Department of Defense and the National Science Foundation 
followed the commission’s recommendation and pursued licensing.13  This lack of 
uniformity reflected the federal government’s uncertainty regarding how intellectual 
property ownership and rights should be managed.  Understandably, this was not 
reassuring to the private sector interested in investing money in the commercialization of 
promising inventions.  Such a fragmented foundation could not be relied on by investors 
interested in pursuing an invention for profit, and, as a result, American businesses were 
spending less private money on research and development than in years past.14 
¶6  The 1960s marked a decade of study regarding America’s patent policy, but with 
little progress or implementation.  President Kennedy, in 1963, issued a Memorandum 
and Policy Statement adopting a middle ground between a licensing policy and a title 
 
6 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
7 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research & Private Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in 
Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663, 1671 (1996). 
8 Id. 
9  The Commission was created by President Roosevelt in 1941. 
10 Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 1673. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 1676. 
13 Id. at 1677. 
14 Brief Amicus Curiae of Birch Bayh in Support of Petitioner, Stanford v. Roche, 131 S.Ct. 2188 
(2011) (No. 09 1159), 2010 WL 5385334. 
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approach.15  The memorandum continued to leave enormous discretion to individual 
agencies in implementing their preferred policy.  More importantly, however, the 
Memorandum requested that the Federal Council for Science and Technology (“FCST”) 
commence annual reporting on the implementation of patent policy by the different 
agencies, and to recommend changes if necessary.16  Two years later, FCST established a 
committee to analyze information on the operation of individual agency patent policy.17  
The Harbridge House study, concluded that commercial utilization of government-
sponsored inventions was very low, regardless of the title owner.18  Ultimately, however, 
the authors also concluded that the evidence did not support a finding that either title or 
nonexclusive licensing was a superior way to promote patent utilization.19 
¶7  Global economic conditions in the 1970s compounded the private sector’s 
frustrations in attempting to commercialize government sponsored inventions.  America 
was facing a recession due, in part, to a reduction in the nation’s competitiveness in 
international markets.20  While Europe and Asia were emerging as international economic 
competitors, America faced a slowdown in technological innovation.21  In 1977, the U.S. 
trade deficit rose to over $33 billion.22  Further, there was a perceived waste of 
commercialization opportunities of patents owned by the government.23  Before passage 
of Bayh-Dole, only five percent of patents owned by the government were being used in 
the private sector.24  This was despite the fact that a portion of the government’s IP 
portfolio had been identified as having potential for “further development, application, 
and marketing.”25  At the time the bill which would become the Bayh-Dole Act was 
introduced in the Senate, there were twenty-six different agency policies regarding the 
use of inventions arising from federally funded research.26 
B. The Bayh-Dole Act 
¶8  With this in mind, Senators Birch Bayh and Robert Dole introduced a bill in the 
Senate27 that focused exclusively on small business and non-profit contractors.28  
Conspicuously absent from the bill was any discussion regarding the rights of large 
industry contractors.  At the time, large industry title rights would continue to be 
determined by the individual funding agency.29 The intent of the Bayh-Dole Act was to 
 
15 Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 1677. 
16 Id. at 1679. 
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 1680. 
19 Id. at 1681. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 1685. 
22 U.S. Census Bureau, Section on U.S. Int’l Trade in Goods and Servs., U.S. Trade in Goods – Balance 
of Payments Basis v. Census Basis, www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/historical/goods.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/VC5B-P7KD]. 
23 Id. 
24 Wendy H. Schacht, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32076, The Bayh-Dole Act: Selected Issues in Patent 
Policy and the Commercialization of Technology, 2 (Mar. 16, 2012). 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 S. 414, 96th Cong. (1980). 
28 Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 1691. 
29 Apparently, this was due to the belief of the bill sponsors that to include large businesses “would 
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create a single, uniform national policy designed to cut down on bureaucracy and 
encourage private industry to utilize government financed inventions through the 
commitment of the risk capital necessary to develop such inventions to the point of 
commercial application.30 
¶9  The focus on small business participation was also apparent from the language of 
the Act; the rationale being that small firms tend to be more innovative than larger 
companies.31  Several federal agencies conducted research that supported the idea that 
small, high technology firms are the primary source of significant innovation.32  A study 
funded by the Small Business Administration concluded that small businesses were 2.4 
times as innovative per employees as large companies.33  Where large businesses were 
thought to be risk-averse, predatory, and short-sighted, small businesses were thought of 
as innovative, efficient, adaptive, and competitive.34 
¶10  Since its passage, The Act’s breadth of governance has been expanded to give large 
business contractors35 the same benefits that Congress explicitly provided originally only 
for small businesses and non-profit institutions.  Since its inception, Bayh-Dole has been 
consistently regarded as a major success in promoting the commercial development of 
technologies that otherwise would have languished in the government’s portfolios.36 
C. Stanford v. Roche 
¶11  Stanford v. Roche did not fundamentally alter the national patent landscape, 
satisfying the expectation of many patent professionals and experts in academia, industry, 
and the university.37  Instead, it reinforced the value of having in place strong contractual 
agreements between the university and its faculty researchers.  However, the real value of 
Stanford v. Roche lies in its ability to serve as a case study for policy makers suggesting 
the need to make changes to the Bayh-Dole Act. 
¶12  At its core, Stanford v. Roche was a case where collaboration between a university 
inventor and a private corporation fulfilled one of the objectives of Bayh-Dole to 
commercialize a socially beneficial government funded invention.  Roche Molecular 
Systems (previously, Cetus Corporation), through the use of industry-standard contracts, 
 
invite automatic defeat of the bill in response to consumer advocates and antitrust lawyers.”  Id. 
30 H.R. REP. NO. 96–1307, pt. 1, at 3 (1980). 
31 Schacht, supra note 24. 
32 Id. at 4. 
33 NAT’L SCI. BOARD, Science and Engineering Indicators—1993 NAT’L SCI. FOUND. at 185 (1993). 
34 Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 1696. 
35 Via a Memorandum to the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, signed in 1983 by 
President Reagan.  Id. at 1694–95. 
36 See Vicki Loise & Ashley Stevens, The Bayh-Dole Act Turns 30, 52 SCI. TRANSL. MED. 2 (2010) 
(concluding that the Act has helped shape America into an “innovation powerhouse”); see also DAVID 
LEVENSON, CONSEQUENCES OF THE BAYH-DOLE ACT, in MIT Open Courseware (2005) (concluding that 
the “country has benefited as a whole from the legislation”); see also Gene Quinn, Bayh-Dole: A Success 
Beyond Wildest Dreams, IPWATCHDOG.COM (Sep. 15, 2015), 
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/09/15/bayh-dole-a-success-beyond-wildest-dreams/id=45171/ (last 
visited March 7, 2016). 
37 Maddy F. Baer et al., Stanford v. Roche: Confirming the Basic Patent Law Principle that Inventors 
Ultimately Have Rights in Their Inventions, THE BASIC PATENT LAW PRINCIPLE (Mar. 2012), 
http://www.washington.edu/faculty/files/2014/06/bayhdole_stanford_roche2012.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/89MA-P4BX]. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  J O U R N A L  O F  T E C H N O L O G Y  A N D  I N T E L L E C T U A L  P R O P E R T Y  [ 2 0 1 6  
 
 178
allowed a Stanford University researcher to use the company’s proprietary intellectual 
property (a biotechnology known as Polymerase chain reaction (“PCR”)), to develop a 
new technique for HIV measurement in blood, which resulted in the creation of an HIV 
testing kit that is now used around the world.38  Roche was able to develop and begin 
commercialization while Stanford University was still in the process of filing patent 
applications for this new measurement technique.39  The results of Roche’s actions are 
precisely what the sponsors of the Bayh-Dole Act envisioned when drafting and passing 
this law.40  The speed and efficiency under which the private sector Roche operated 
brought the product to market in roughly three years, while the university was attempting 
to market the invention.   
1. Background 
¶13  In 1985, a small Silicon Valley biotechnology research company named Cetus 
Corporation (“Cetus”) started developing methods to quantify blood-borne levels of the 
human immunodeficiency virus (HIV)—the virus that causes AIDS.41  PCR,42 a Nobel 
Prize winning technique developed at Cetus in 1983, was an integral part of the efforts to 
quantify levels of HIV.43 
¶14  In 1988, in large part due to Cetus’s PCR technique, scientists at Stanford 
University’s Department of Infectious Diseases began to collaborate with Cetus scientists 
to test the efficacy of new AIDS drugs.44  Dr. Mark Holodniy joined Stanford during this 
time as a research fellow in the department, and signed a Copyright and Patent 
Agreement (CPA).45  Stanford’s agreement with Dr. Holodniy, in particular stated that he 
“‘agree[d] to assign’ to Stanford his ‘right, title, and interest in’ inventions resulting from 
his employment at [Stanford] University.”46 
¶15  Dr. Holodniy’s research focused on developing an improved method for 
quantifying HIV levels in patient blood samples, using PCR to measure ribonucleic acid 
(RNA) from HIV in the blood plasma of infected humans.47  Because Holodniy was 
largely unfamiliar with PCR, his supervisor arranged for him to conduct research at 
 
38 Brief for Respondents at 10–11, Stanford v. Roche, 131 S.Ct. 2188 (2011) (No. 09-1159), 2011 WL 
288882. 
39 See Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2188, 
2192 (2011). 
40 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2000) (stating that one of the objectives of The Act is to “promote 
commercialization and public availability.”). 
41 Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2188, 2192 
(2011). 
42 The technique has been widely used in DNA research, forensics, and genetic disease diagnostics.  Its 
inventor, Dr. Kary Mullis, received the Nobel Prize in 1993, the only Nobel Prize ever awarded for 
research performed at a biotechnology company. 
43 Roche Molecular Sys., 131 S. Ct. at 2192. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. Such assignments are typically used with scientific personnel at companies and research 
institutions. 
46 See Stanford University v. Roche Molecular Systems, Inc., AMERICA PINK, 
http://america.pink/stanford-university-roche-molecular-systems-inc_4154005.html (last visited Feb. 24, 
2016); see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 118a–119a, Stanford v. Roche, 131 S.Ct. 2188 (2011) (No. 
09-1159) 2010 WL 1138571. 
47 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 122a–124a, Stanford v. Roche, 563 U.S. 776 (2011) (No. 09-1159). 
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Cetus.48  In February 1989, Holodniy began regular visits to Cetus over several months to 
learn PCR and to develop a PCR-based assay for HIV.49  As a condition of gaining access 
to Cetus, Holodniy signed a Visitor’s Confidentiality Agreement (“VCA”).50  The 
agreement that he signed stated, “I will assign and do hereby assign” to Cetus any right, 
title, and interest in each of the ideas, inventions, and improvements made as a 
consequence of the research access to Cetus.51 
¶16  Holodniy’s research at Cetus and his collaboration with Cetus employees resulted 
in a PCR-based procedure for calculating the amount of HIV in a patient’s blood.52  This 
procedure would allow doctors to determine whether a patient was benefitting from a 
particular HIV therapy.53  Once this research was concluded, Dr. Holodniy returned to 
Stanford where he and two other University employees54 tested the HIV measurement 
technique.  On May 14, 1992, the University filed several patent applications related to 
the procedure.55  Because some of the research related to the HIV measurement technique 
was funded by the National Institutes of Health (NIH)56—thereby subjecting the 
invention to the Bayh-Dole Act—Stanford disclosed the invention to the government, 
granted the government a nonexclusive, nontransferable, paid-up license to use the 
patented procedure, and formally notified the NIH that it elected to retain title to the 
invention.57  Stanford subsequently secured three patents to the HIV measurement 
process.58  Cetus never applied for a patent on the procedure, nor challenged Stanford’s 
application. 
¶17  In December 1991, Roche purchased Cetus’s PCR operations, including Cetus’s 
agreements with Stanford University.59  After this purchase, Roche began manufacturing 
and marketing HIV detection kits (based on the measurement technique developed by 
Holodniy).60  Stanford later approached Roche, demanding that it take a license to the 
Stanford patents in which Holodniy was a named inventor, alleging that the Roche 
product infringed the Stanford patents.61  Roche refused, indicating that the VCA 
Holodniy signed with Cetus made Roche, through assignment, a joint owner of the 
patents with the freedom to practice the patented technology.62  Stanford disagreed, 
countering that the inventions were made under federally sponsored research that 
 
48 Roche Molecular Sys., 131 S. Ct. at 2192. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. 
51 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 122a–124a, Stanford v. Roche, 563 U.S. 776 (2011) (No. 09-1159) 
2010 WL 1138571. 
52 Roche Molecular Sys., 131 S. Ct. at 2192. 
53 Id. 
54 Those University employees were Thomas C Merigan and David A. Katzenstein.  See Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari  at 33, Roche Molecular Sys., 563 S.Ct. 2188 (No. 09-1159) 2010 WL 1138571. 
55 Roche Molecular Sys., 131 S. Ct. at 2192. 
56 Id. at 2193. 
57 See 35 U.S.C. § 202 (2000). 
58 U.S. Patent No. 5,968,730 (filed June 6, 1995); U.S. Patent No. 6,503,705 (filed Feb. 13, 2001); U.S. 
Patent No. 7,129,041 (filed Dec. 16, 2002).  All three patents descended from a common parent application. 
59 Brief for Respondents at 10–11, Stanford v. Roche, 563 U.S. 776 (2011) (No. 09-1159) 2011 WL 
380825. 
60 Id. 
61 Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2188, 2193 
(2011). 
62 Id. 
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Holodniy had earlier assigned to Stanford, which, under the auspices of the Bayh-Dole 
Act, Stanford owned.63 
2. District Court Case 
¶18  In 2005, the Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University filed suit 
against Roche Molecular Systems, Inc., alleging that Roche’s HIV detection kits were 
infringing Stanford’s three patents.64  Roche argued that it had acquired the rights to the 
patents when it purchased Cetus, and pleaded the ownership theory in three forms: (i) as a 
declaratory judgment counterclaim; (ii) as an affirmative defense; and (iii) as a challenge 
to Stanford’s standing to sue for infringement.65  The district court held that Roche’s 
counterclaim for ownership of the patents was barred by the California statute of 
limitation.66 
¶19  Stanford also argued that it had a “right of second refusal” to the patents subject to 
the Government’s right of first refusal, under 35 U.S.C. § 202(d) of the Bayh-Dole Act as 
described above.67  The district court agreed with Stanford, holding that Holodniy could 
only keep title to his inventions “[i]f a contractor does not elect to retain title to a subject 
invention.”68  However, the district court also held that the patent claims were invalid for 
obviousness. 
¶20  Both parties appealed. 
3. Federal Circuit  
¶21  The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court that Roche’s ownership 
counterclaim was barred by the California statute of limitation, but held that the 
affirmative defense of ownership was not barred and that “questions of standing can be 
raised at any time and are not foreclosed by, or subject to, statutes of limitation.”69  The 
court then determined that Roche had in fact acquired the rights to the three patents due 
to the agreement that Holodniy had signed with Cetus.70 
¶22  Citing two prior Federal Circuit cases,71 the court held that the language “agree to 
assign” in the agreement that Stanford had Holodniy signed was merely a promise to 
assign his invention rights to Stanford at some undetermined point in the future.72  Also, 
when Holodniy signed the contract, Stanford’s Administrative Guide to “Inventions, 
Patents, and Licensing” stated that: “[u]nlike industry and many other universities, 
Stanford’s invention rights policy allows all rights to remain with the inventor if 
 
63 Roche Molecular Sys., 131 S. Ct. at 2193. 
64 Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 487 F. Supp. 2d 1099, 
1111, 1115 (N.D. Cal. 2007). 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 1117. 
67 Id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 202(d)). 
68 Id. at 1118. 
69 Bd. of Trs. of the Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 583 F.3d 832, 837 
(Fed. Cir. 2009). 
70 Id. at 842. 
71 Speedplay, Inc. v. Bebop, Inc., 211 F.3d 1245, 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2000); FilmTec Corp. v. Allied–Signal, 
Inc., 939 F.2d 1568, 1572–73 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
72 Roche Molecular Sys., 583 F.3d at 842. 
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possible.”73  With respect to the Cetus contract, the Federal Circuit interpreted the 
contract language “do hereby assign” to be “a present assignment of Holodniy’s future 
inventions to Cetus,” thereby giving Cetus immediate rights in Holodniy’s future 
inventions.74  By the time Holodniy executed an assignment to Stanford three years later 
with respect to the patent applications that Stanford filed, his rights had already 
transferred to Cetus and the subsequent assignment was void.75  
¶23  The Federal Circuit found that Stanford itself received constructive notice of 
Cetus’s ownership rights at least through Holodniy’s employment by Stanford—in other 
words, Holodniy’s knowledge of the Cetus agreement was imputed to his employer.76  
The Court also found that Stanford had similar constructive notice through Holodniy’s 
supervisor, who directed Holodniy to work with Cetus and executed agreements of his 
own that transferred intellectual property rights to Cetus.77  Although Stanford asserted 
that Holodniy signed the agreement with Cetus solely on his own behalf and not 
Stanford’s, the Court found that this argument missed the point.78  According to the 
Federal Circuit, the agreement with Cetus indicates that Holodniy was acting as an 
independent contractor with respect to Cetus, not with respect to Stanford, and that 
“Holodniy [had] signed away his individual rights as an inventor, not Stanford’s.”79 
¶24  With respect to Stanford’s claims about the Bayh-Dole Act, the Federal Circuit 
overruled the district court’s decision, holding that the Act does not void an otherwise 
valid prior transfer of rights.80  As a result, Stanford was entitled to only those rights that 
remained after the Government declined to exercise its option.81 
¶25  According to the Federal Circuit, Stanford therefore lacked standing to sue Roche, 
the district court lacked jurisdiction over Stanford’s infringement claim, and the district 
court should not have addressed the validity of the patents.  Accordingly, the Court 
vacated the district court’s finding of invalidity and remanded the case for dismissal due 
to lack of standing.82  Stanford appealed to the Supreme Court based on its argument that 
Bayh-Dole overrides normal ownership of inventions. 
4. United States Supreme Court 
¶26  In November 2010, the Supreme Court agreed to hear the case.  The case was 
decided on June 6, 2011.  The decision was “largely moot” as the majority, led by Chief 
Justice Roberts, held that U.S. patents have always (since 1790) initially vested in “the 
inventor” and that the non-specific language of the Bayh-Dole Act does nothing to 
change the original framework.83 
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¶27  The effects on patent law were negligible.  The Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari 
for this case came as a surprise to many intellectual property attorneys who did not 
believe that the Bayh-Dole Act changed the centuries old proposition that inventors 
ultimately have rights in their patents.84  As a result, the Supreme Court’s decision 
reassured inventors, as well as all those involved in the practice of intellectual property 
law, that their longstanding belief that ownership rights in inventions belong first and 
foremost to inventors is correct. 
II. AMICUS BRIEFS 
¶28  Stanford v. Roche highlighted the competing interests that have shaped the 
application of Bayh-Dole.  Through their amicus briefs, industry organizations, private 
individuals, intellectual property owner groups, technology transfer managers, and 
universities weighed in on the then-future outcome of this case.  Their briefs 
demonstrated a diverse and often divergent range of interests that each group actively 
tried to account for under the Bayh-Dole framework.  The process of reforming 
university policy to satisfy all of these interests will require concessions and flexibility 
from all parties.  However, when this is achieved, Bayh-Dole will effectively govern the 
technology transfer policies of our nation’s universities, satisfying its objective of 
commercializing socially beneficial discoveries for the public in a way that rewards the 
university, inventor, and private industry, while simultaneously protecting the investment 
of the federal government and the public. 
A. Private Industry 
¶29  The interest groups writing on behalf of private industry strongly support 
collaboration between business and university research departments.  Academic licensing 
has, over 15 years of available data, contributed between $86 billion and $388 billion per 
year (in 2005 dollars) to the gross domestic product, and total number of “person years of 
employment” range from 900,000 to 3 million over the same time period.85  The transfer 
of technology between industry and academia is a major focus of these interest groups, 
and is central to the industry output and job creation in America.86 
¶30  Eli Lily and others argue that a tremendous amount of money is invested in the 
research and development of new technologies, and a clear framework of patent title and 
assignability is central to off-setting some of that risk.87  Even after enormous amounts of 
energy and capital are invested in a single product such as a biopharmaceutical medicine, 
it is estimated that there is still only a one in 5,000 chance that the medicine will make it 
 
84 See Maddy F. Baer et al., Stanford v. Roche: Confirming the Basic Patent Law Principle That 
Inventors Ultimately Have Rights in Their Inventions, LES NOUVELLES 19 (Mar. 2012), 
http://www.washington.edu/faculty/files/2014/06/bayhdole_stanford_roche2012.pdf. 
85 The Economic Contribution of University/Nonprofit Inventions in the United States: 1996-2010, 
BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUSTRY ORG., http://www.bio.org/articles/economic-contribution-universitynonprofit-
inventions-united-states-1996-2010 (last updated June 20, 2012) [https://perma.cc/3EZ5-2PZZ]. 
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87 See Brief of Intel Corporation, Eli Lilly, and Company, Johnson & Johnson, Life Technologies 
Corporation, Pfizer Inc., and Sap America, Inc. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents 9–11, Stanford 
v. Roche, 563 U.S. 776 (2011) (No. 09-1159). 
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from the lab to the market.88  For this reason, Eli Lily has a keen interest in reducing its 
risk whenever possible. 
¶31  Large pharmaceutical companies, in order to promote collaboration with nonprofit 
research institutions, rely on surety of title.  To own a patent outright one day, then the 
next day (or many years down the road) have it taken away through no act or fault of the 
company will stifle any desire that private industry has to collaborate. It is especially 
troubling for private industry if a university were to recognize the enormous value in a 
discovery, hire the researcher, and then disingenuously sprinkle the research with federal 
funds for the sole purpose of invoking Bayh-Dole.89  For obvious reasons, this scenario 
would halt collaboration between private industry and non-profits. 
B. Public 
¶32  Prior to Bayh-Dole’s passage, about $75 billion of taxpayer money was being 
invested into government-sponsored research & development each year.90  The United 
States’ patent portfolio was estimated to contain around 28,000 patents; yet fewer than 
five percent of them were being commercially licensed.91 Today, the United States 
remains a major supporter of technological innovation and research.92  More than half of 
the scientific and technical research conducted at the university level is funded by federal 
grants.93 
¶33  The public-at-large was represented in a number of briefs authored by the United 
States, BayhDole25, a nonprofit organization,94 and even former Senator and author of 
the bill, Birch Bayh.  The principle interest that these groups sought to further (on behalf 
of the American public) was the efficient use of tax dollars to get beneficial inventions 
back into the hands of the American people.  To this end, the interest groups voice major 
concern with the prospect of the public “double paying” for an invention.95  That is, the 
public essentially is paying twice for the same invention when a private firm holds an 
exclusive right to an invention that has been generated using federal funding—initially 
through the taxes to support the research that produced the invention, then again through 
royalty costs being recouped by the company via monopoly pricing when the product hits 
the market.96  The broad issue can be framed as “the public paying once and getting 
nothing, or paying twice and getting the innovation.”97 
 
88 See Joseph A. Di Masi & Henry G. Grabowski, The Cost of Biopharmaceutical R & D: Is Biotech 
Different?, 28 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 469, 475 (2007). 
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90 Bayh-Dole Act-History, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bayh-Dole_Act (last viewed July 30, 
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91 Ashley J. Stevens, The Enactment of Bayh-Dole, 29 J. TECH. TRANSFER 93, 94 (2004). 
92 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Stanford v. Roche, 563 U.S. 776 (2011) (No. 09 1159), 
2010 WL 3777203. 
93 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-09-742, INFORMATION ON THE GOVERNMENT’S 
RIGHT TO ASSERT OWNERSHIP CONTROL OVER FEDERALLY FUNDED INVENTIONS 1 (2009). 
94 “BayhDole25 is a non-profit that advocates for preserving the value of the BayhDole Act.” 
BAYHDOLE25.ORG, www.bayhdole25.org [https://perma.cc/R4SM-YG6E] (last visited Feb. 12, 2016).  
95 Gary Pulsinelli, Share and Share Alike: Increasing Access to Government-Funded Inventions Under 
the Bayh–Dole Act, 7 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 393, 443 (2006). 
96 Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 1666. 
97 Pulsinelli, supra note 95, at 443. 




¶34  Universities now stand at a crossroads due to Bayh-Dole; they currently have an 
affirmative duty to take steps to bring socially beneficial intellectual property to the 
public,98 while preserving their historical mission of producing and preserving public 
knowledge.99 
¶35  The current university policy model defines one of the goals of a publicly 
subsidized research university as research in basic science.100  Basic science describes 
natural phenomena and foundational principles of the world, and is inherently 
noncommercial.101  This charge is a remnant of institutional policy-makers immediately 
following World War II,102 and demands reconsideration.  Basic scientific research has 
evolved dramatically and there is no longer a clear delineation between basic science and 
applied science (applied science has historically been considered to be the interest of the 
engineering departments, and commercial in nature103).104  This basic research focus is 
not only perpetuated by social expectations and the policy-makers themselves, but also 
by the federal government’s actions to maintain this pursuit.105  Tax regulators and 
funding agencies expect universities to perform public, noncommercial research.106  A 
university’s tax-exempt status is dependent upon, among other things, its noncommercial 
research goals.107  Further, legal restrictions have been imposed on the amount of space 
that universities are allowed to devote to research that is commercial in nature.108  Even 
private universities have construed their mission as one that excludes product-
development activities.109 
D. Inventors 
¶36  The interest groups representing the inventors and private owners of intellectual 
property view their members as serving a critical societal function by the research they 
conduct, and acknowledge that their responsibility is primarily to the public.110  The 
research produced at our nation’s institutions continues to be recognized as central to our 
democracy, and conducted with the purpose of supporting the common good.111  The 
United States Supreme Court has repeatedly been committed to the idea that faculty and 
 
98 35 U.S.C. § 200 (2000). 
99 See Liza Vertinsky, Universities as Guardians of Their Inventions, 4 UTAH L. REV. 1949, 1981–82 
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110 AM. ASS’N U. PROFESSORS POLICIES AND REPORTS, 1915 DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES ON 
ACADEMIC FREEDOM AND TENURE, available at: http://www.aaup.org/report/1915-declaration-principles-
academic-freedom-and-academic-tenure (last visited July 30, 2013) [https://perma.cc/53AV-8G37]. 
111 Brief of American Association of University Professors, IEEE-USA, and IP Advocate as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Affirmance at 11, Stanford v. Roche, 563 U.S. 776 (2011) (No. 09-1159). 
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academic professionals are the keystones to the perpetuation of freedom through the 
training of the nation’s youth.112 
¶37  Inventors employed by a university generally wish to retain title to the fruits of 
their labor so that they have the power to contractually assign those rights away in 
exchange for royalties.  Allowing a contractor, by obtaining federal funding, to eliminate 
rights acquired by a third party is contrary to the intent of Bayh-Dole, according to the 
authors.113 
¶38  The inventor groups maintain that The Act first and foremost establishes a 
“regulated contracting regime” that operates within the federal contract and procurement 
system.114  Under this scheme, the title rights of each party can be determined by the 
federal funding agreements (pursuant to Bayh-Dole § 202(c))115 between the federal 
agency and the federal contractor and the assignment agreements between the inventor(s) 
and federal contractor.116  The act requires not that the university automatically be given 
title when federal funds are used, but rather that the university secures invention title and 
patent rights through contract.117 
¶39  A major concern is that basic research is becoming less of a focus for private 
industry.118  While the United States leads the world in patent outputs, China now leads 
the world in bringing “high technology” to the marketplace.119  Further, the “high 
impact” journals based in the United States are becoming filled with articles that 
originate outside of this country.120 The IEEE is concerned that American business focus 
on commercialization of technology is swallowing up the desire to be the most 
technologically innovative country.121  That is, the private sector is seeking a more 
streamlined approach to supply chains and commercialization of products at the expense 
of actually creating the ground-breaking innovations which underlie the system.122  
¶40  Another major threat to nonprofit/industry collaboration, according to the inventor 
groups, is the concern that a university will superficially sprinkle an invention with 
federal funds, thus taking title away from the private company.123  This concern is 
seemingly validated because the Bayh-Dole Act applies to inventions that are conceived 
or first reduced to practice in the performance of work using federal funds.124  That is, 
even if an invention is first conceived by an inventor working for a private company 
using no government funding, the university could still acquire ownership of the 
invention if it was first actually reduced to practice under the funding agreement.125  Even 
if the inventor/private company already filed a patent application, this is only a 
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constructive reduction to practice, not an actual reduction as required by the Act.126  By 
vesting title automatically with the inventor, and subsequently allowing them to assign 
the rights as they see fit, there is no concern of a federal contractor acquiring title to an 
invention that a private company does not intend on dispensing. 
¶41  Transparency among the interested parties, according to the inventor groups, allows 
for proper balance of interests and rights between the university and faculty.  
Recognizing the co-dependent nature of the academic relationship, there should not be 
attempts to hide information or usurp the rights of one another.  Rather, faculty should be 
informed of the specifics in any intellectual property agreements that they sign with the 
university.127  Relatedly, faculty should be expected to uphold their end of the bargain 
regarding intellectual property discoveries and not attempt to undermine or go around the 
university’s contractual rights. 
E. Federal Government 
¶42  The federal government sought to protect its own interest in intellectual property128 
by arguing that (in most cases) title rights vest automatically in the contractor.129  From 
here, the contractor may elect to retain title.130  If the contractor declines to retain title or 
fails to comply with his statutory duties under the act, the government funding agency 
may step in and take title.131  Only after the agency has taken title does the inventor even 
have the potential to exercise any rights in the invention—if the federal agency decides to 
affirmatively grant the inventor’s request for rights.132 
¶43  Under this interpretation of Bayh-Dole, a specific hierarchy emerges: at the top of 
the ladder is the contractor who initially has title; next, the U.S. government, who can 
gain title under a variety of scenarios, but mainly, if the contractor elects not to retain 
title; and lastly, the inventor, whose rights in the invention are only created if the 
contractor fails to retain title and the government elects, after consultation with the 
contractor, to give title to the inventor.133  This chain of command appears dubious if 
efficient commercialization is one of the main objectives of Bayh-Dole.134  It would seem 
that the government is substituting efficiency in commercialization for its own title 
security in inventions.  That is, even if the inventor wanted to further a discovery and 
both the university and the U.S. agency had no interest in doing so, there would either be 
a lengthy delay as the inventor waited for the title to pass from the university to the 
agency, then waited again for the agency to consult with the contractor before passing 
title to the inventor, or the agency could choose not to pass title to the inventor at all.  The 
inventor, who may be the most capable of making the invention marketable, is, under the 
United States’ argument, the least capable of actually getting title.135 
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¶44  On the other hand, commercialization may be best served when title passes from 
the contractor to the government, instead of vesting immediately in the inventor or 
passing from the contractor to the inventor.  Both inventors and nonprofits face the 
challenge of balancing profit motive with the desire to benefit the public.  Universities 
and other nonprofits should, in theory, be less susceptible to this conflict than individual 
inventors.  However, as discussed in other briefs, this is becoming less and less of the 
case.  Regardless, there is fear that an inventor with title could shop the discovery for the 
largest payout, not necessarily the best prospect for commercial success.136  While it 
would seem that these two considerations are inseparable, this is not always the case.  
Patent trolls purchase intellectual property for the sole reason of suing others for patent 
infringement.137  There is nothing barring an inventor from selling title to a key invention 
to one of these firms, who would do nothing useful or beneficial with it.  For this reason, 
it may be a good thing that the government is an intermediary between the contractor and 
the inventor.  The government, once it has taken title to an invention, has the power to 
grant exclusive or partially exclusive licenses, but only under certain conditions.138  A 
license can only be granted when it is a “reasonable and necessary incentive to . . . 
promote the invention’s utilization by the public.”139  Further, the licensee must make a 
commitment to achieve practical application of the invention.140 
¶45  On the one hand, an inventor, if vested with title either initially or following the 
contractor’s surrender, would likely be best situated to pursue the invention through the 
various development stages, both because of their intimate knowledge of the invention 
and because of their self-interest in capitalizing on its success.  On the other hand, the 
government has an interest in the property that arises from their investment of federal 
funds.  Further, there is concern that an inventor may put profit before the public interest 
and sell their title to the highest bidder rather than the one best situated to bring the 
invention to market.  The government, on the contrary, is only able to license the 
invention when it would promote the public interest and the licensee has made a 
commitment to commercialize the product. 
F. Venture Capital 
¶46  Venture capital is a subset of private equity, typically coming from high net worth 
individuals or venture capital firms.141  Investors provide capital to new and emerging 
businesses with perceived long-term growth potential.142  Generally, these start-up 
businesses are unable to secure financing through traditional means (i.e. banks or public 
markets) due to their assets, size, and stage of development, and so they must turn to 
venture capital firms for their funding needs.143  Venture capital investments are often 
made in exchange for equity in the company (as opposed to debt) as well as an active role 
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in the company’s operations.144  These equity investments are crucial because lenders 
generally will not lend to a business without a substantial equity cushion or collateral.145 
After injections of venture capital, these start-ups are able to more rapidly leverage 
themselves and grow.  Due to the risk associated with investing in a start-up, investors 
often require a higher rate of return on the money than a traditional lender.146 
¶47  This form of capital is essential for new and emerging businesses in high 
technology industries such as Information Technology, Medical/Health/Life Science, and 
Non-High Technology.147 Eleven percent of private sector jobs come from venture-
backed companies and venture backed revenue accounts for 21% of America’s Gross 
Domestic Product.148  In 2012, $4.1 billion was invested in biotechnology (like Cetus’s 
polymerase chain reaction (PCR) technique) alone.149  In total, nearly $6.7 billion in 
venture capital was invested in these early-stage, high risk start-up companies.150 
¶48  The author of this amicus brief, the National Venture Capital Association (NVCA), 
“advocates for public policies that encourage innovation, spur job creation, and reward 
long-term investment in start-up companies.”151  As the major trade group for venture 
capitalists, NVCA speaks on behalf of over 400 members, including the many of the 
largest venture capital firms in the nation.152 NVCA members invest in a wide array of 
industries: biotechnology, semiconductors, health care, and telecommunications, to name 
a few.153  Accordingly, the NVCA is intimately familiar with the effects that the Bayh-
Dole Act has on intellectual property in a given industry, and how this guides their 
investment strategies.154 
¶49  At the heart of the NVCA’s interest in Stanford v. Roche and the Bayh-Dole Act is 
rate of return.  This proposition should be readily apparent from the outset, given the 
nature of venture capital and its use as a vehicle for investment.  However, for money to 
be made and returns paid to investors, the venture capital industry relies on the intelligent 
allocation of risk.  Risk would be most efficiently allocated when operating under a clear 
framework of ownership rights in the inventions that the venture capital firms would be 
investing in.  The NVCA argues that reversal of the Federal Circuit’s opinion would 
restore Bayh-Dole’s central goal of a “straight forward and predictable ownership 
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federal funding.155  Thus predictability of ownership is the key concern of those who 
invest in the commercialization of technology.     
III. DISCUSSION 
¶50  Some universities possess the resources to see an invention all the way from 
discovery to marketplace, while others may seek to sell the rights to the invention to a 
third party as quickly as possible.  What generally exists today is a race from discovery to 
commercialization with the university obtaining as much control over the invention as 
they can.  This is not necessarily the most effective way to move inventions to the public, 
and not conducive to an environment envisioned by the drafters of Bayh-Dole.  
Universities must be able to self-evaluate their ability to control intellectual property, and 
then act accordingly, pursuant to that determination.  If they are aware that they do not 
have the private investments available to fund commercialization themselves, then they 
should perhaps sell the IP rights quickly after discovery.  If their technology transfer 
office is understaffed or undermanaged, perhaps a license back to the inventor is the best 
way to speed development.  Unfortunately, the approach taken by many universities 
(usually those least able to fund their discoveries) is that it’s better to let an invention lay-
waste while trying to commercialize it rather than identifying a more suitable 
commercializer early on and relinquishing their rights.  
¶51  This is not a moral condemnation of those universities not equipped to manage the 
entire commercialization process; rather, it should be motivation to move discoveries into 
the hands of more capable managers to ensure commercialization while also benefiting 
from royalties paid on the licenses.  On the other hand, while the major research 
universities may be capable of overseeing the entire process, policy changes may need to 
be implemented in those institutions to ensure that the objectives of Bayh-Dole remain 
the motivation behind their actions (it is unlikely that Bayh-Dole contemplated the 
possibility of MIT, by virtue of their licenses and commercialization, becoming the 11th 
largest economy in the world, if they were to form a nation today).  
A. Universities as Commercializers 
¶52  When Bayh-Dole was passed into law in 1980, it transferred the responsibility for 
optimizing socially beneficial inventions from the federal government to universities.  As 
a result, universities are in a far superior position to promote an economic ecosystem that 
generates economic benefits to the university and inventor, and also economic growth 
potential to the private sector and the economy in general.  Many universities (in fact, 
most) do not have the economic capability, manpower, access to venture capital, nor 
desire to tend to an invention all the way from discovery to commercialization.  As 
Timothy L. Faley and Michael Sharer put it, “universities are not commercializers.”156 
¶53  However, some universities do support impressive commercialization efforts.   A 
2010 survey by the Association of University Technology Managers (AUTM) determined 
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that since Bayh-Dole’s passage in 1980, more than 8,107 new businesses have been 
created to commercialize academic discoveries.157  The reason that universities are 
credited for commercialization when these new businesses are created is because these 
start-ups are most often headed by the faculty researcher associated with the discovery.  
In some instances, research assistants and technicians working under the principal 
investigator (faculty researcher) may also be invited to join the start-up business and 
assist in further development. 
¶54  These are scenarios where the university effectively and efficiently manages an 
invention all the way to commercialization.  Some universities are in a position to 
achieve this.  Wendy Schacht, in her Congressional Research Service report, indicates 
that the vast majority of start-up businesses created to manage university discoveries are 
associated with just seven schools: MIT, The University of California, California Tech, 
The University of Minnesota, Johns Hopkins University, The University of Utah, and 
The University of Virginia.158  These universities undoubtedly possess all the 
characteristics that are needed to create a productive innovation ecosystem. A 2009 report 
concluded that MIT graduates, faculty, and staff have founded 25,800 active companies, 
employing over 3 million people and generating $2 trillion in annual revenue.159  Another 
study indicates that the University of California system generates $91 million in net 
licensing income each year.160 
1. Recognizing the Dual Nature of Scientific Research 
¶55  Scientific discoveries have increasingly become more dual-natured.161  Patentable 
inventions have been created both as inputs into further discovery and as an invention 
with immediate commercial application.162 To halt the perpetuation of basic research 
being the sole goal of university research and to reform the mission of research 
universities to include research in innovations that are both basic and applied, the 
changing nature of science and technology needs to be accounted for. 
¶56  Due to the failure to adapt as scientific research becomes more dual-natured, 
governmental funding of research often ends at the completion of the discovery phase.163  
Because of this premature withdrawal, funding sources such as the Small Business 
Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) programs 
have formed to support later stages of research and to bridge the gap between research 
and development.164  However, financial support from these programs has paled in 
comparison to the support received from federal agencies.165  Where the NIH alone had a 
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budget of over $30.9 billion in 2011, with 80% being given to research institutions,166 the 
SBIR and STTR programs had only $2.4 billion that year, with a total of $32.9 billion 
awarded since its inception in 1983.167   
¶57  To acknowledge the practical application of scientific research and further assist an 
invention towards commercialization, public funding needs to be extended beyond the 
discovery phase.  Such funding would provide the university inventors with the resources 
necessary to further develop their inventions beyond the time when an innovation is 
disclosed.  When this happens, private investors are more likely to invest, because their 
risk is lessened when the invention is beyond its embryonic stage, where the efficacy of 
the invention may not be apparent and the chances of commercial success or failure are 
hardest to measure.168  Furthermore, the basic research that the further-developed 
invention is predicated on would remain in the public domain for a longer period of time, 
allowing society to benefit from the different applications that can arise from a single 
basic discovery.  Under the old model, universities had to rush out and patent any new 
discoveries because, lacking the resources to develop it, they had to lay their claim in the 
intellectual property so they could license it. Otherwise, they would be stuck holding 
basic research that they were unable to develop.  Now, the university can publish the 
basic research while also applying it to the prospective innovations that they see fit. 
2. Retention of Tacit Information 
¶58  Another barrier to commercialization is the challenge associated with sharing tacit 
knowledge in the face of dealing with business professionals lacking in-depth technical 
knowledge.169  The development process is more likely to require this exchange of 
information between the university and private industry.170  Continued inventor 
engagement downstream is almost always necessary for the successful commercialization 
of an invention.171  However, in many cases, a university researcher is happy being just 
that—a researcher.  As a basic discovery snowballs into a large commercially focused 
project, many academics return to basic research.  To be certain, some inventors are 
commercially driven from the start.  However, a great many are content just doing 
research without working with a commercializer.  Unfortunately, the tacit knowledge 
associated with a particular discovery is often central to that discovery’s commercial 
success.172 The inventor and his or her team are intimately familiar with their particular 
innovation, and thus possess not only the specialized knowledge of how the innovation 
functions conceptually, but also how their particular innovation would succeed in the 
marketplace.   
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¶59  Admittedly, this is a difficult problem to overcome because people generally do not 
want to be forced into activity that they find uninteresting.  Courts generally do not look 
favorably on compelling another person to work for someone if they do not wish to do so.  
There is no easy or sure solution to this problem.  Contracting for this would be helpful, 
but not reliable.  Of course, economic incentives are always a nice carrot.  To entice a 
researcher to remain with a project, employment contracts might set out certain bonus 
levels, in addition to royalty payments, to be paid out if the inventor remains through 
certain phases of the project.  Likewise, a private company investing in early-stage 
innovation could offer the same thing to a researcher.  Also, employment agreements 
could contain provisions that would require an inventor to, in addition to the actual 
innovation, transfer all tacit and intimate knowledge along to the private company. 
3. Technology Transfer Offices 
¶60  The use of contractual assignments by universities to protect their interest in the 
research that their faculty-inventors conduct appears to be an efficient approach to Bayh-
Dole.  However, the contract must take the proper form to remain efficient and superior 
to any problems that automatic vesting in the university has.  A central concern with the 
contract scheme of Bayh-Dole is that the university may become the owner of many 
inventions and patent rights that they have no intention of pursuing or they lack the 
resources to commercialize.  This outcome is contrary to the objectives of Bayh-Dole and 
needs to be remedied.173  Through broad contracts, such as the one in Stanford, a 
university could be vested title to every invention that arises through the use of federal 
funds, whether they actually plan to pursue its commercialization or not.  Furthermore, 
there is concern that even after the Stanford decision, universities are not amending their 
employment contracts to correct the deficiencies brought to light by Stanford.174  
¶61  While there are a fair number of universities that are categorically capable of 
commercializing their own inventions, there is a general inability to learn anything more 
from analyzing their technology transfer strategies.  That is, rather unexpectedly, even the 
successful university-commercializers lack a general uniformity in technology transfer 
policy that one would expect.  For example, two of the most successful research 
institutions, Johns Hopkins University and Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(“MIT”) have university-managed technology transfer offices.175  Conversely, the 
University of Wisconsin, another incredibly successful research institution and a pioneer 
in university technology transfer, allows a private non-profit entity (the Wisconsin 
Alumni Research Foundation, or “WARF”) to manage its patents.176  Similarly 
uninformative, the technology transfer offices (TTOs) of these commercializing 
universities have, by all appearances on their websites, associates that represent a diverse 
field of expertise.177  This is important because technology disclosures will (hopefully) 
emerge from a variety of fields, and possessing an expert in that particular area of 
research will help to ensure that the disclosure is properly understood to allow for more 
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efficient movement to commercialization.178  However, the actual amount of associates 
staffed by these university TTOs does not help guide our understanding of what a 
successful university looks like.  As stated above, there are experts at these TTOs with 
backgrounds in many different fields.  However, MIT employs experts in nine unique 
fields,179 while Johns Hopkins boasts 16 unique areas of expertise.180 
¶62  On the other hand, there are some common outcomes shared by these “successful” 
universities.  The top research universities all possess highly productive researchers.  This 
quality seems intuitive, but it is worth noting that all researchers are not created equal.  
Furthermore, these more productive universities have a history of high industry 
participation and collaboration.  However, it is unclear whether these traits led to the 
continued success, or whether the continued success led to these traits. 
¶63  In sum, universities must honestly, and critically, self-evaluate their technology 
transfer capabilities.  While similarities in certain aspects of TTO policies at these 
“successful” schools may occasionally arise, we still lack any consistency in policy 
implementation that we can point to and say “this is what makes commercialization at the 
university level work.”  For this reason, it is difficult for an outsider to analyze university 
policy and reach a conclusion regarding their potential to be successful commercializers.  
Therefore, individual universities, from within, must look at their own access to capital, 
staff adequacy and capabilities of their TTOs, and other intangibles that affect 
commercialization capabilities.  If they do not possess the same resources as an MIT or 
Johns Hopkins (and they likely do not), then they have a responsibility to seek out 
alternative ways to get their invention out of their own hands and into the hands of those 
capable of doing so. 
4. Access to Venture Capital 
¶64  Congress sought to encourage the injection of risk capital into the development and 
commercialization of inventions in enacting Bayh-Dole.181  As conceived under Bayh-
Dole, universities and non-profits would retain title to any inventions that were created by 
their employees, thereby giving them the exclusive right to negotiate licensing with 
venture-backed companies willing to invest in those inventions.182  This straightforward 
ownership model would encourage the venture capital investments necessary to 
commercialize these inventions because, for example, a start-up company (backed by 
venture capital) holding an exclusive license from a university would feel secure in the 
legitimacy of this license simply by pointing to the contract that they have with the 
university.183  On the contrary, National Venture Capital Association (or “NVCA”) 
members hesitate to invest substantial sums of money in a startup whose business plans 
are premised on licenses of technology of questionable ownership.184  This problem 
manifests itself in two main ways when the inventor(s) is endowed with the ownership 
rights of their invention: (1) they may (perhaps unwittingly) enter into multiple, 
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conflicting contracts (as seen in Stanford) regarding licensing of their invention, or (2) as 
is often the case, an invention may be the work-product of multiple inventors where 
ownership stakes are unclear.  These two concerns are related, and the problem of 
multiple inventors has the potential to exacerbate the problem of revealing every 
contractual obligation related to an invention.   
¶65  NVCA members take substantial risk in investing in startups that seek to purchase 
licensing rights from universities and non-profits.  According to The Economist, one 
“dollar’s worth of academic invention or discovery requires upwards of $10,000 of 
private capital to bring to market;” essentially, these venture capital-backed startups pay 
for over 99% of the innovation’s final cost.185  While such extraordinary claims cannot be 
easily substantiated, the costs of bringing such inventions to market can be 
significant.  Venture capital firms already take on a tremendous amount of investment 
risk—that’s the nature of the game, which is why it is so lucrative.  However, if these 
firms must also fear that the licenses on which these investments are predicated may turn 
out to be unenforceable due to questions of ownership, they may be much more likely to 
conclude that the cost of the risk is not worth the investment.186  This, of course, would 
result in the stifling of innovation and commercialization of necessary inventions that 
stand to positively impact the world.  For the NVCA and its members, by vesting 
ownership rights in the university or non-profit receiving the federal funding, the Bayh-
Dole Act creates a clear and predictable ownership framework. This framework allows 
the NVCA and its members to assess (and be compensated for) risk and invest in startups 
seeking to license these innovations and bring them to market. 
¶66  Venture capital-backed small businesses are changing the way that technologies are 
being created and commercialized in America’s non-profits and universities under the 
Bayh-Dole Act. As expected, Venture Capital creates a double-edged sword: on the one 
hand, universities receive substantial funds from industry that are used to invest in 
additional research, thus creating the potential for greater breakthroughs that serve the 
public interest.187 On the other hand, there is fear that venture capital is undermining the 
commercialization of patentable technologies by redefining the purposes of academic 
research, creating academic conflicts of interest and gambling on the more economically 
lucrative technologies while allowing the potentially more efficacious ones to spoil in 
their portfolios.188 
B. Alternatives to University Commercialization 
¶67  There is ample empirical evidence to suggest that technology markets do not 
operate as efficiently as the university or the private sector desires.189  Among 
organizations involved in “significant licensing activity,” 47% of licensing negotiations, 
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once commenced, ended unsuccessfully.190  Failure was generally attributed to 
disagreement over financial terms, too many parties involved in the negotiation, or 
because a useful bundle of intellectual property could not be assembled.191  At the 
university level, this problem can be exacerbated because of under-staffed and ill-
equipped technology transfer offices.  Problems also arise due to a general deficiency in 
legal knowledge by inventors and a lack of innovative knowledge by technology 
managers.  With the goal of eliminating waste that results from squandered patents, 
universities must evaluate their own needs and capabilities.  Some universities will be 
suited to follow an invention all the way from disclosure to commercialization.  Many 
others, however, will need to assess alternative options that reward the university (in the 
form of royalties) for its initial investment, but subsequently take control of the 
intellectual property to satisfy Bayh-Dole’s commitment to the commercialization of 
federally funded innovations. 
¶68  Three viable remedies exist for universities who underutilize their intellectual 
property: (1) intellectual property clearinghouse; (2) patent pools; and (3) patent auctions.  
The strengths and deficiencies of each access system will be discussed specifically; 
however, it is important to note that a particular system will not be appropriate for every 
research institution, type of intellectual property, or area of research.  As stated earlier, 
adopting a policy to conform to Bayh-Dole cannot be a one-size-fits-all task.  Each 
university will still be charged with recognizing the unique form that their discovery 
takes and the requirements that it entails, and determining which access system192 is the 
most appropriate or most likely to result in the successful commercialization of that 
technology.  For this reason, it will still be necessary for technology transfer offices (or at 
least technology transfer professionals) to remain on university staff to assist with this 
decision-making. 
1. Intellectual Property Clearinghouse 
¶69  Bridging the gap between a patent holder and potential licensee is essential to 
efficient commercialization of intellectual property under Bayh-Dole.  Throughout 
history, patent professionals (agents and lawyers) have played an indispensable role in 
matching inventors with parties who wish to develop and commercialize inventions.193  
In the late 1800s, purchasers of new technology would often consult with patent 
professionals about the merits of an invention before purchasing it.194  These same patent 
professionals would also use nationwide networking connections to market patents to 
potential buyers in exchange for a fee.  Acting as intermediaries, patent agents and 
lawyers helped improve the efficiency of patent trading by connecting buyers and sellers 
who normally would not have reached one another.  Through their relationships with 
patent holders and prospective licensees, these agents were able to acquire specialized 
 
190 Richard Razgaitis, U.S./Canadian Licensing in 2005: Survey Results, LES NOUVELLES (Dec. 2006), 
available at http://www.lesfoundation.org/pdf/2005SurveyResults.pdf [https://perma.cc/XBU4-WMCZ]. 
191 Id. at 240. 
192 Aoki & Schiff, supra note 189, at 195–97. 
193 Kourtney Baltzer, Note, A Clearinghouse: The Solution to Clearing Up Confusion in Gene Patent 
Licensing, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 519, 532 (2011). 
194 Id. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  J O U R N A L  O F  T E C H N O L O G Y  A N D  I N T E L L E C T U A L  P R O P E R T Y  [ 2 0 1 6  
 
 196
knowledge regarding the wants and needs of the parties and match those interested 
expeditiously.195 
¶70  The idea of a technology clearinghouse was embraced by the federal government in 
1986.  As an amendment to the Stevenson-Wydler Act196, the Federal Technology 
Transfer Act codified alterations to the technology transfer process.197  The Act also 
established the Federal Laboratory Consortium for Technology Transfer.198  The 
consortium, among other things, functions as a clearinghouse, where an individual, 
company, or technology transfer office can search for available technologies by name or 
funding agency.199 
¶71  A third-party clearinghouse is an effective way to match providers and users of 
information and innovations.200  Optimally, federal contractors will be matched up with 
potential licensees (most commonly, from the private sector), either for the exchange of 
information concerning patented technologies or, ideally, for the arrangement of licensing 
agreements.201  The clearinghouse acts as a middleman, facilitating exchanges between IP 
owners and IP consumers.202  An intellectual property clearinghouse can take a variety of 
forms.  Aoki & Schiff identify four unique classifications of clearinghouses: (1) third 
party informational; (2) third party licensing; (3) collective informational; and (4) 
collective licensing.203  The designation of “third party” or “collective” refers to the 
ownership structure, while “informational” or “licensing” indicates the respective 
functions performed.   
¶72  As we will see, the third party licensing clearinghouse is arguably the most 
effective structure for university-private industry technology transfer.  However, to reach 
this conclusion we must briefly discuss the variations among each form.  Ownership of 
the clearinghouse will affect the incentives and motivations by which it operates.  The 
prices that a clearinghouse charges for its services, as well as the royalties that it sets will 
vary depending on whether it is owned and managed by a third party or as a collective.204  
Regardless of whether it is an independent non-profit or for-profit entity, or a voluntary 
association by a board of directors elected by the member organizations, the 
clearinghouse’s status will dictate its goals, management styles, and mission.  Relatedly, 
IP clearinghouses can either take the form of an informational clearinghouse or a royalty 
collection clearinghouse.  Informational clearinghouses only facilitate access to 
information about intellectual property.205  Services like Google’s patent search206 and 
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BirchBob207 facilitate the informational exchange between IP owners and users, 
compiling databases for users to search for intellectual property.  For example, Google’s 
free service allows online searching of the full text of more than 7 million patents issued 
by the USPTO over the past 220 years.208  Licensing clearinghouses, on the other hand, 
provide information, as well as issue standardized licenses and collect and distribute 
royalties.209 
¶73  The clearinghouse structure most conducive to efficient and expedient technology 
transfer leading to commercialization between universities and private industry must take 
the form of a third party licensing operation.  It is unlikely that any collectively run 
clearinghouse would succeed for many of the same reasons that Bayh-Dole has fallen 
short.  The diverse interests of the universities, inventors, and private industry highlight 
the potential problems in an IP collective clearinghouse.   The operation would turn 
inefficient relatively quickly, in the same manner that negotiations on the free market 
between universities and private industries often do.  For this reason, a clearinghouse that 
effectively facilitates IP transactions between a university and a business must be a 
neutral third party.  Furthermore, the most effective clearinghouse would not only possess 
informational databases, searchable by organization members, but also have the power to 
license the intellectual property and collect and disperse royalties. 
¶74  An intellectual property clearinghouse that is owned and operated by a third party 
and has power to license and collect royalties is optimal for universities to move 
information quickly from their laboratories into the hands of companies with the ability 
to commercialize.  Not only does this structure have the ability to centralize information, 
but it has independence and is free from biases in licensing transactions, improving 
economic efficiency.210 
¶75  The unique advantages that a third party licensing clearinghouse provides have the 
ability to satisfy the wide array of interests that have historically bogged down the 
application of Bayh-Dole.  The problems discussed earlier that have plagued Bayh-Dole 
and were brought to light in Stanford will be greatly alleviated when universities elect to 
join a clearinghouse that connects their role as researchers and innovators with the private 
industry’s desire to commercialize and market new inventions. 
¶76  Both information and licensing clearinghouses have the ability to provide an 
online, searchable database, which is a necessary condition for effective technology 
transfer between university and industry.211  The centralization of information about 
patents facilitates more effective dissemination of knowledge than individual 
investigations performed by small-scale licensees.212  A searchable database satisfies both 
university and industry interests, as well.  This format allows for a private company to 
conduct a search for available intellectual property using little more than relevant search 
terms, eliminating the need for investigators and agents to contact university technology 
transfer offices individually.  Conversely, universities benefit from the ability of member 
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businesses to upload their technology needs to a searchable database designed for the 
university to look for potential licensees.  This most basic feature of a clearinghouse is a 
crucial first step to bridging the gap between business and university. 
¶77  The most beneficial functions of a licensing clearinghouse are overseeing and 
streamlining licensing deals.213  A central problem that technology transfer faces under 
Bayh-Dole is the university’s rigid, almost unreasonable stance on licensing 
negotiations.214   University blanket approaches to negotiations, such as never granting 
indemnity and never making representations regarding originality, are harmful to 
intellectual property transfer and commercialization.215  Such unwavering positions 
prevent fruitful negotiations between the university and industry: often universities are in 
the best position to control the risk, yet want to transfer the risk to the company, often 
without compensation for this additional exposure.216  A third party licensing 
clearinghouse can alleviate this problem through its ability to standardize licensing 
negotiations and contracts, set licensing prices, and oversee licensing deals.217  
Standardized licenses containing essential and immutable clauses reduce the transaction 
costs associated with the time and energy spent on negotiation.  Lynda Covella and David 
Newman suggest that the essential clauses contained in every deal include, inter alia, 
licensed subject matter, field of use, license rate, and term of the license.218  All other 
non-essential clauses would be standardized as much as possible.219   
¶78  Standardizing all of the clauses that are commonly negotiated over will require 
concessions by both parties, but will greatly reduce legal expenses associated with these 
often lengthy and frustrating discussions.  Furthermore, it will minimize instances of a 
party walking away from a transaction because of disagreeable conditions: both the 
university and the company will be aware of what their obligations are.  Relatedly, the 
clearinghouse would streamline the license pricing methodology.  Patent examiners, 
attorneys, and agents employed by the clearinghouse, in partnership with financial 
professionals, would resolve uncertainty regarding intellectual property value.220  In a 
field not easily anchored by a particular valuation measure, universities and companies 
benefit from pricing set by independent experts that both parties can rely on now and use 
as estimates when valuing intellectual property in the future.  This eliminates the typical 
use of licensee opening bids to set the value of an invention.221   
¶79  Furthermore, a licensing clearinghouse can organize and oversee licensing deals in 
a way that informational clearinghouses cannot.  With the information and knowledge 
collected about numerous patent holders, the clearinghouse could bundle a variety of 
licenses from a number of universities to license to a company as a package.  This 
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advantage eliminates the need for a licensee to contact each individual patent holder to 
negotiate a license.222  Essentially, the clearinghouse serves as a one-stop-shop for a 
potential licensee to find the combination of patents that it needs for its particular 
technology.  The university also benefits from this feature where it may possess an 
invention that is unmarketable on its own, but able to be licensed and earn royalties when 
bundled with complementary technology from other universities. 
¶80  Finally, the third party licensing clearinghouse can enforce the licensing contracts, 
monitor for infringement, and compel alternative dispute resolution between aggrieved 
parties.  The cost for a clearinghouse to monitor the use of licenses to detect any patent 
infringement is likely considerably less than the cost for each university to monitor each 
of their licenses.  The cost of this service would, naturally, be deducted from the royalty 
payments dispersed to a university.  The clearinghouse, as one of its essential functions, 
would have a duty to perform these investigatory functions to detect patent 
infringements.  Having access to information regarding all of their member licensees 
makes this task simpler.  Furthermore, the clearinghouse can periodically contact 
licensors to inquire as to whether they have been made aware of any possible IP 
infringements and employ a staff of professionals who monitor media outlets for potential 
infringements.223  In addition, the clearinghouse can compel arbitration or mediation in 
disputes arising between the university and private industry. 224  Patent litigation costs are 
exorbitant,225  and thus both patent holders and licensees will find this option more 
appealing.  Compulsory arbitration or mediation could be included in one of the essential 
clauses found in every licensing agreement, discussed above.226 
¶81  In today’s world, university-industry collaboration is seldom disrupted by spatial or 
geographical limitations.  An eager buyer can seamlessly connect with a willing seller 
anywhere on Earth.  However, intellectual property transactions remain subject to 
disparate knowledge between parties, which creates an information gap and reduces 
efficiency to the same or to a higher degree than any physical distance would.227  
Furthermore, inflexible and unreasonable negotiation strategies are counter-productive to 
achieving mutually beneficial licensing agreements.  An intellectual property 
clearinghouse tailored to fit the unique interests of both the universities and the private 
industry can alleviate these concerns and efficiently facilitate technology transfer 
pursuant to the goals of Bayh-Dole.228  Uniform licensing agreements, third party 
patrolling and enforcement of intellectual property transfer, and open access to the 
innovations possessed by universities and the technologies needed by industry are central 
to more efficient commercialization of socially beneficial inventions born from federal 
funding. 
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2. Patent Pools 
¶82  An alternative proposal to an intellectual property clearinghouse is that universities 
search for, identify, and join patent pools of complimentary patents.  The responsibility to 
identify complimentary technologies and create or join a pool would fall on a university’s 
technology transfer office.  Once the TTO receives the intellectual property assignment, 
they would be charged with searching for existing pools containing technologies that 
would complement their own, or joining a network whereby new pools can be created 
through the coming together of technologies possessed by multiple institutions. Because 
we are contemplating alternatives for universities unable to commercialize innovations 
themselves, we will only discuss patent pool licensing to third parties.  However, it 
should be noted that that the cross-licensing of patent pool patents amongst the members 
of a single pool also occurs. 
¶83  In most areas of research, individual discoveries have resulted in the issuance of 
many patents, “each constituting an essential element of a larger information base.”229  
As a result, for any firm to make use of these new technologies, more and more often 
they have to acquire multiple intellectual property rights.230  This becomes a severe 
hindrance to commercialization when the patents are not owned by the same entity.  
Rudy Santore et al. point to the elements of a human gene as an example of the 
entanglements that arise from multiple patent owners.231  Several institutions may hold 
the intellectual property rights to separate regions of genes, markers of specific gene 
attributes and functions, and tools of research.232  The development of any beneficial 
technology will likely require the developer to negotiate licenses with each individual 
holder of each element.  As should be clear, this is an inefficient way to promote 
commercialization.  The issue becomes increasingly frustrated when the university owner 
does not possess the resources to cross-license complimentary technologies to promote 
commercialization, but still holds out on negotiating their individual patent. When 
complementary patents are licensed jointly as a package, obtaining a single license from 
the patent pool means that the licensee has access to all of the intellectual property 
covered by the patents in the pool.233 
¶84  Administration of the patent pool can take a variety of forms; however, not all 
forms are appropriate for universities.  A third party management organization can 
administer a patent pool on behalf of the pool members, or one of the members of the 
pool can take on the responsibility and manage on behalf of all of the members.234  When 
forming or joining a patent pool, a university TTO must insist that management is a third 
party non-member.  A university unable to successfully license its own intellectual 
property by itself should not be in charge of licensing a pool of IP.  Similar to a 
clearinghouse, a third party administrator has an incentive to quickly and efficiently 
license the patent pool to those readily able to commercialize. 
 
229 Rudy Santore, Michael McKee, & David Bjornstad, Patent Pools as a Solution to Efficient Licensing 
of Complementary Patents? Some Experimental Evidence, 53 J. LAW & ECON. 167, 167 (2010). 
230 Id. 
231 Id. at n.1. 
232 Id. 
233 Aoki & Schiff, supra note 189, at 194–95. 
234 Id. at 195. 
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3. Patent Auctions 
¶85  A relatively new forum for technology and patent monetization, live patent 
auctions, were begun in April, 2006 by a Chicago IP consulting firm, Ocean Tomo.235  
Although a truly innovative and “first-of-its-kind event”,236  the live patent auction has 
generally failed to take off as was expected.  Ocean Tomo’s first auction offered sixty-
eight lots, yet only sold 26 (roughly 38%).237  In 2007, the first European intellectual 
property auction was held in Germany.  Despite these numbers, Ocean Tomo’s auctions 
have shown some potential.238 
¶86  Patent auctions have the potential to be an efficient medium for universities to 
move patents into the hands of private companies eager to commercialize them.  Auction 
houses match sellers and buyers of intellectual property without the university expending 
its own limited resources to do so.  Furthermore, auctions reduce transaction costs by 
eliminating lengthy and arduous negotiations in favor of a fast-moving auction block.239  
This also cures inefficiencies resulting from unreasonable negotiation and licensing terms 
favored by universities regarding certain representations and warranties.  Auctions would 
issue standard, uniform contracts when facilitating the sale of patents from holder to 
purchaser. 
¶87  On the other hand, there is concern that patent auctions, even if they were viable 
options for universities as a way to get patents into the hands of those able to 
commercialize them, create an environment ripe for so-called patent trolls.240  These 
patent trolls have no plans to commercialize the patent, but rather make their money from 
threats of litigation against alleged patent infringers.241  Fawcett and Chan fear that patent 
auctions eliminate some of the hurdles that patent trolls faced when attempting face-to-
face negotiations with a patent holder.242  At a live auction, the auction house closely 
guards the anonymity of both bidders and sellers.  While this move facilitates inability for 
competing companies to get a leg-up on what markets competitors may be entering or 
exiting, it also allows for patent trolls to anonymously purchase patents where they would 
otherwise be blocked from doing so.  A research institution would likely be very wary 
about entering into face-to-face negotiations with a known patent troll, if for no other 
reason than this is antithetical to Bayh-Dole.  However, where a seller does not know the 
identity of their purchaser, these safeguards against non-commercialization cannot be 
protected. 
 
235 Michelle Tyde & Andrea Bates, The New IP Marketplace: Patent Auctions, GT ALERT (Apr. 2006); 
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¶88  Furthermore, the patent auctions that exist now sell patents both in individual lots 
and bundles.243  This is an efficient and expedient way to bundle complementary patents 
from a single patent holder and move them to a purchaser; for example, each lot that 
Ocean Tomo puts up for auction contains on average three patents.244  However, 
universities often need to only sell one patent at a time, or multiple patents that often are 
not complementary and arise out of different research focuses.  Since auctions are able to 
sufficiently accommodate the selling of individual patents rather than lots, they will 
likely be suitable for universities as a means to quickly move patents to the private sector.   
¶89  Currently, patent auctions are still in their infancy and are used as a mechanism for 
bankrupt companies to liquidate some of their assets.245  However, once a more 
developed infrastructure is created to facilitate the sale of individual patents quickly and 
in a manner that can prevent the infiltration of patent trolls, the patent auction has the 
potential to be used on a university scale. 
CONCLUSION 
¶90  Since its enactment, Bayh-Dole has made significant improvements to the process 
by which federally funded research is commercially developed and the benefits brought 
to the consuming public. The universities that lie at the heart of this process play a critical 
role in managing the implementation of the Act’s goals and objectives.  If managed 
properly, this technology transfer can prove to be financially rewarding to the university 
and the economy. If managed poorly, valuable research can find its way into the black 
hole of the technology transfer office, never to find a commercial application.  Because 
the university invention disclosure process may require that the researcher refrain from 
publishing the results of their research prior to exploring the possibility of patent 
opportunities, this black hole can also impair the inventor’s scholarship prospects.   
¶91  Universities must perform a self-assessment to determine what technology transfer 
strategy should be adopted for their particular institution. Such a strategy must be 
developed in collaboration with faculty inventors and the private sector, taking into 
consideration the competing interests of the participants and the economic realities of the 
local and regional ecosystem.  In the event that a particular university’s research base and 
economic realities do not warrant internal expenditures to fully implement such a strategy 
and requisite management function to achieve Bayh-Dole’s objectives, they are left with 
two choices:  They can disclose the invention to the funding agency and not take 
ownership, or disclose and pursue an outside mechanism such as an intellectual property 
clearinghouse, patent pool or auction to further promote commercialization.
 
243 John Jarosz et al., Patent Auctions: How Far Have We Come?, 45 LES NOUVELLES 11, 17 (2010). 
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